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Note 
Preponderance, Plus: The Procedure Due to 
Professional Licensees in State Revocation Hearings 
ALLAINA M. MURPHY 
A licensee who is subjected to professional discipline often experiences harsh 
and stigmatizing consequences as a result: humiliation; disgrace; loss of reputation, 
livelihood, and client base. Unfortunately, this, at times, happens on the basis of an 
unsubstantiated complaint. Procedural due process protections apply to 
professional license revocation actions to help prevent such error, but states vary 
widely in the combination and strength of the procedural safeguards they require in 
such hearings. It is far more likely that an undeserving professional will be unfairly 
and permanently harmed in a state with minimal procedural safeguards. This Note 
focuses on procedural due process issues in state administrative professional 
license revocation hearings—specifically, whether, and under which circumstances, 
the preponderance of the evidence standard provides sufficient due process for 
licensed professionals in administrative disciplinary hearings. This Note argues 
that “preponderance alone” is not sufficient when a state has no other safeguards 
in place. However, preponderance of the evidence may be appropriate in states that 
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Preponderance, Plus: The Procedure Due to 
Professional Licensees in State Revocation Hearings 
ALLAINA M. MURPHY * 
INTRODUCTION 
A license is defined as: “permission to act.”1 Under its legal definition, 
a license is “[t]he certificate or document evidencing such permission.”2 
Professional licenses play an important role in the lives of every American. 
Whether working in a profession that requires they be licensed, or requiring 
a service provided by professionals in those professions, every American 
encounters a professional license on a regular basis. Licensing is required 
for more than three-quarters of jobs in healthcare, more than two-thirds of 
jobs in the legal profession, and more than half of jobs in education. This 
accounts for approximately twenty-three percent of the U.S. workforce, 
according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.3 But also, approximately 
2.8 million jobs are lost annually because of licensing issues.4 
Licensing laws are implemented with the intent to protect public health 
and safety by creating barriers to employment—through testing, training, 
and fees—in professions determined to be sufficiently dangerous.5 As such, 
a professional who has obtained a license has presumptively met the 
requisite level of competency and qualification, and once the state has 
granted a professional his license, the licensee has a due process protected 
property interest in the license:  
The kind of property interests that due process encompasses 
extends beyond the actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or 
                                                                                                                     
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 2020; Bates College, B.A. 2015. I would like to 
extend my sincerest thanks to the members of the Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful editing, 
diligence, and support throughout this process. Also, I would like to thank my Note Editor for his patient 
guidance throughout the drafting process. Finally, thank you to my parents, for everything else.   
1 License, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/license (last 
visited May 27, 2020).  
2 License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
3 U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION 
SURVEY 1, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat49.htm (last updated Jan. 22, 2020).  
4 MARK FLATTEN, GOLDWATER INST., PROTECTION RACKET: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LAWS 
AND THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING 5 (2017), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/protection-racket-
occupational-licensing-laws-and/. 
5 NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING DATABASE EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/occupational-
licensing-statute-database.aspx.  
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money to include legitimate claims of entitlement to 
governmental benefits. . . . “Much of the existing wealth in this 
country takes the form of rights that do not fall within 
traditional common-law concepts of property. It has been aptly 
noted that ‘[s]ociety today is built around entitlement. The 
automobile dealer has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer 
their professional licenses, the worker his union membership, 
contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and 
stock options; all are devices to aid security and 
independence.6  
Due process protections apply to license revocation actions by the state. The 
government cannot deprive the individual of an issued license to practice in 
the profession without the appropriate procedural safeguards. There are 
harsh and stigmatizing consequences of license discipline—humiliation, 
disgrace, loss of reputation and client base. This, at times, happens on the 
basis of an unsubstantiated complaint, making those procedural 
safeguards—notice, hearing, and perhaps, evidentiary standard—all the 
more important.  
This Note focuses on procedural due process issues in state 
administrative professional license revocation hearings. Specifically, this 
Note focuses on whether—and under which circumstances—the 
preponderance of the evidence standard provides sufficient due process for 
licensed professionals in administrative disciplinary hearings. It concludes 
that “preponderance alone” is not enough and additional safeguards must be 
in place. The preponderance of the evidence standard may be sufficient in 
states that have other procedural safeguards in place—“preponderance, 
plus.” In states that lack such safeguards, a higher evidentiary standard of 
clear and convincing evidence is required to satisfy due process. 
Part I of this Note examines the state licensing boards. It begins with the 
background, function, and policy of state licensing boards as part of the state 
administrative system. It discusses the background and policy of states 
delegating authority to such boards, and the disciplinary measures licensing 
boards are authorized to carry out. Part I culminates in a discussion of the 
board’s authority to revoke licenses in disciplinary hearings.  
While there is a basic process that most states follow—at times, with 
minimal procedural safeguards for the licensee—for disciplinary hearings, 
each state formulates its own procedural rules and there is much variation 
among the fifty states. Part II discusses many of these differences, compares 
various revocation practices, and discusses potential procedural due process 
                                                                                                                     
6 J. Bruce Bennett, The Rights of Licensed Professionals to Notice and Hearing in Agency 
Enforcement Actions, 7 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 205, 208 (2006) (footnote omitted) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970)). 
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issues in license revocation hearings. Perhaps the most striking difference 
between states is that currently, thirty-two states have a preponderance of 
the evidence standard and sixteen states maintain a clear and convincing 
standard in disciplinary hearings for professional licensees.7 This split has 
given rise to much debate on which standard is required by procedural due 
process.  
Part III builds on this discussion of the state differences and analyzes the 
state split of evidentiary standards in the quest to determine whether the 
preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies procedural due process. 
This discussion entails the stated rationales and policy implications of each 
side, as well as the additional procedural safeguards that each side has in 
place. This analysis concludes that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard alone—without additional procedural safeguards in place—is 
insufficient procedural due process for licensees.8 This Note suggests that 
the “plus” required when the preponderance of the evidence standard is 
utilized is a proper separation of roles and powers—and biases—within the 
adjudicatory process.   
The following discussion will solely reference professional licenses 
from the medical and dental fields so that tangible public risk and policy 
concerns can be equitably accounted for.  
I. STATE PROFESSIONAL LICENSING BOARDS 
A. Background, Purpose, and Public Policy 
Administrative agencies first entered the United States legal landscape 
in 1865 to assist with an expanding government under President Johnson.9 
Administrative law has greatly expanded in the last 150 years and, today, 
agencies have wide discretion and authority far beyond that originally 
imagined.10 This growing authority is due, in part, to the fact that agencies 
                                                                                                                     
7 FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS 67 (2018), 
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/publications/us-medical-regulatory-trends-actions.pdf 
[hereinafter FSMB]. The Federation of State Medical Boards is the national association of medical and 
osteopathic boards. 
8 Because of the vast number of state professional and occupational statutes and independent 
processes, which vary both by state and profession, the following discussion is necessarily limited in 
scope. The body of this Note focuses on professional licenses over occupational licenses, with special 
attention to disciplinary processes, over all other functions and powers of state licensing boards. The 
majority of the discussion is based on medical board sources. However, most professions contain the 
same standard, with the exception of attorney licensing which typically uses a clear and convincing 
standard in most states. 
9 See A Brief History of Administrative Government, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, 
https://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3461 (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (discussing 1865, a year that 
Andrew Johnson was President, as the beginning of independent regulatory commissions). 
10 See Judah A. Schechter, De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Factual 
Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (1988) (making it 
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wield powers of each of the three principal branches of government.11 The 
statutes under which most agencies operate give them: (1) the legislative 
power to issue rules and the authority to issue penalties for violation of those 
rules; (2) the executive power to investigate potential violations of rules and 
prosecute offenders; and (3) the judicial power to adjudicate disputes over 
failure to comply with the standard.12  
State administrative agencies mirror federal agencies: most states enact 
a state administrative procedure act or follow the Revised Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act,13 agencies derive power from authorizing 
statutes,14 and agencies oversee a specific field. State agencies more 
significantly impact the everyday lives of individuals than many federal 
agencies. In several states, as many as seventy independent agencies make 
rules and adjudicate contested cases affecting the lives, health, fortunes, 
safety, labor, and business of millions of citizens.15 More than two thousand 
state administrative agencies exercise both legislative and judicial 
functions.16 In carrying out their duties, these agencies are largely 
independent of the legislature and the courts. 
A state licensing board, authorized to regulate the corresponding 
profession for the general welfare of its citizens,17 is one of the most 
prevalent state agencies for American citizens. A person seeking to practice 
in a particular profession must first obtain, and then retain, a license from 
the state in which they hope to practice.18  
                                                                                                                     
clear that the Founding Fathers “envisioned a judicial system in which most adjudication would take 
place in judicial, not administrative, tribunals”).  
11 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 25–26 (1965).  
12 Id.   
13 REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010), 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=f184fb0c-5e31-4c6d-
8228-7f2b0112fa42 (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).  
14 See Pork Motel Corp. v. Kan. Dep’t of Health & Env’t, 234 Kan. 374, 378 (1983) 
(“Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and their power is dependent upon authorizing statutes; 
therefore, any exercise of authority claimed by agency must come from within the statutes . . . no general 
or common law power that can be exercised by an administrative agency.”). 
15 1 COOPER, supra note 11, at 1–2.  
16 Id. at 2. 
17 Tara K. Widmer, South Dakota Should Follow Public Policy and Switch to the Preponderance 
Standard for Medical License Revocation After In Re the Medical License of Dr. Reuben Setliff, M.D., 
48 S.D. L. REV. 388, 396 (2003).  
18 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (“The power of the state to provide for the 
general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure 
or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception and 
fraud.”). Licensing is required for more than three-quarters of jobs in healthcare, more than two-thirds of 
jobs in the legal profession, and more than half of the jobs in education. Labor Force Statistics from the 
Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/cps/aa2016/cpsaat53.htm 
(last updated Feb. 8, 2018).  
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In the American federalist system, the authority to issue most licenses 
lies at the state level, within the purview of each state’s police power.19 The 
Supreme Court first confirmed the constitutionality of licensing 
requirements in Dent v. West Virginia,20 where the Court considered a state 
law requiring that a physician graduate from a reputable medical school and 
pass a qualifying examination or prove that he had practiced medicine in the 
state for a period of ten years in order to practice medicine.21 The Court 
acknowledged that because every individual has a right to pursue a lawful 
occupation, the legislature cannot arbitrarily prevent a person from working 
in the occupation of his choice,22 but a state may adopt a licensing scheme 
as a means of protecting public health and safety.23  
In the past seventy years, there has been a large increase in the number 
of regulatory agencies that license and regulate businesses and 
professionals.24 In the 1950s, the U.S. economy was based on 
manufacturing, and less than five percent of all workers in the United States 
were required to have a license to do their jobs.25 Today’s economy is more 
                                                                                                                     
19 U.S. CONST. amends. X, XIV. See, e.g., Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926) 
(“[T]here is no right to practice medicine which is not subordinate to the police power of the states.”); 
Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding Florida license requirement for interior 
designers constitutional), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1004 (2012); Onyiuke v. N.J. State Supreme Court, 435 
F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding state rule requiring graduation from accredited law school 
as prerequisite to licensure rationally related to “legitimate interests in ensuring high standards of 
qualification”), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Onyiuke v. New Jersey, 242 F. App’x 794 (3d Cir. 
2007); Walker v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Superior Court of Tenn., 38 S.W.3d 540, 550 (Tenn. 
2001) (finding regulation that required attorneys to disclose specialty certification in advertisements was 
valid). For information on federal licenses, see Federal Licenses & Permits, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., 
http://www.sba.gov/content/what-federal-licenses-and-permits-does-your-business-need (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2019). 
20 129 U.S. at 128.  
21 Id. at 124–25.  
22 Id. at 121–24 (citations omitted).  
23 Id. at 122. Although the states’ power to license was not confirmed by the Supreme Court until 
1889, state regulation of professional licenses began as early as the mid-1700s. See Kathleen L. Blaner, 
Comment, Physician Heal Thyself: Because the Cure, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, May 
Be Worse Than the Disease, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (1988) (“As early as 1760, colonies created 
boards of medical examiners to evaluate individuals seeking to practice medicine and to issue licenses to 
those individuals the boards found qualified.”). And, professional licensing boards and societies 
originated after the Civil War, when societies enacted standards to use as a measure of the professional’s 
competency in disciplinary actions. Id. at 1078–79. 
24 See Mary Feighny & Camille Nohe, A Species Unto Themselves: Professional Disciplinary 
Actions, 71 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 29, 29 (2002) (“In Kansas, a person can’t cut hair, trim beards, give legal 
advice, perform surgery, clean teeth, embalm bodies, fill prescriptions, neuter cats, design buildings, or 
pierce bodies without getting the State’s blessing. This means that an applicant for such sanctions needs 
to satisfy a regulatory body that he or she has satisfied certain prerequisites designed to ensure a minimum 
level of competency. Once permission is secured, a licensee must then comply with rules by the agency 
or risk losing the privilege to practice that profession.”). For a comprehensive list of all professions that 
require a state regulated license, see License Finder, U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
https://www.careeronestop.org/toolkit/training/find-licenses.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2020).  
25 FLATTEN, supra note 4, at 5.  
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service-oriented, and as such, between twenty-five and thirty percent of 
workers must have a license from the government.26 While some of this 
growth can be attributed to changes in workforce (more people are doing 
jobs that have long required a license), the last half of the twentieth century 
saw an explosion in the number of occupations subject to regulation, and 
approximately two-thirds of the growth occurred because previously 
unlicensed jobs have been added to the list of those regulated.27 The 
Supreme Court has outlined the parameters of the state’s police power 
regarding licenses: “States have a compelling interest in the practice of 
professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect 
the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to 
establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of 
professions.”28 
State legislatures create licensure boards to oversee certain professions 
and give boards the authority to discipline anyone who violates the rules, 
regulations, ethics, or other standards of the profession.29 The role of the 
licensure boards is to protect consumers from professionals who fail to 
maintain the requisite standards.30 It is in a state’s interest to ensure that only 
qualified practitioners serve the public.31 The goal of state licensing boards 
is to protect the public against unprofessional, improper, unauthorized, and 
unqualified practice, as well as to secure for the public the services of 
                                                                                                                     
26 Id.  
27 THE WHITE HOUSE, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 3, 6 
(2015). For a list of occupations that require a license, see 2 DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR 
JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 13 
(2017). See also id. at 44–144 (listing states and their licensing requirements).  
28 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). Usually, the power to issue a license and 
oversee licensee is through a state administrative agency. See, e.g., 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.00 (2012) 
(“Disciplinary Proceedings for Physicians”). 
29 See Richard Waring, What Your Licensing Board Expects of You, in THE MENTAL HEALTH 
PRACTITIONER AND THE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK 101, 101 (Lawrence E. Lifson & Robert 
I. Simon eds., 1998) (“Despite the fact that the federal government regulates and finances medical 
practice in the United States in an extensive way, the licensing and disciplining of physicians is 
exclusively a function of state government.”). See infra Appendix A for a list of citations for each state 
administrative procedure act. The state APAs lay out the basic requirements for licensing that are 
particular to each state. The professions that are licensed in every state are: health related occupations, 
attorneys, accountants, barbers, cosmetologists, truck drivers, teachers, pesticide applicators, funeral 
directors, school bus drivers, and athletic trainers. 2 CARPENTER, supra note 27, at 44–144. Although 
these are universally licensed occupations, states vary tremendously with respect to the experience and 
training required for licensure. For example, a barber in Maryland is required to complete 280 days of 
experience and education, where in Idaho, a barber is required to complete 630 days of experience and 
education. Id. at 68, 85. 
30 See infra Part II for a discussion on the public policy supporting licensing boards.  
31 Feighny & Nohe, supra note 24, at 29.  
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competent and trustworthy practitioners.32 Regulatory and disciplinary 
authority allow state licensing boards to carry out these goals.33  
The following discussion will solely reference professional licenses 
from the medical, dental, and legal fields so that a tangible and agreed upon 
public risk can be accounted for.  
B. Constitutional Sources of Licensed Professionals’ Procedural Rights 
To carry out their policy and regulatory goals, licensing boards need the 
ability to revoke licenses from practitioners who pose a harmful risk to 
public welfare and safety. However, this authority is necessarily limited by 
procedural safeguards to protect the licensees: “This right to choose one’s 
calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the object of government 
to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a man’s property and right. Liberty 
and property are not protected where these rights are arbitrarily assailed.”34  
The United States Constitution, and most state constitutions, contain a 
clause providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. The “touchstone” of due process is the 
protection of the individual from the arbitrary action of the government,35 
meaning that procedural due process protects a person from an erroneous or 
mistaken deprivation of life, liberty, or property by guaranteeing the 
application of fair procedures.36 Due process is “flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”37 The 
“procedure due” is not universally applicable to every situation.  
The discussion of the requisite due process required in administrative 
hearings was first discussed in depth in 1970 when the Supreme Court 
decided Goldberg v. Kelly.38 In Goldberg, welfare beneficiaries in New 
York claimed their payments were terminated without due process of law.39 
The welfare program in question was based on a system of statutory 
entitlements where all applicants who met the conditions were entitled to 
                                                                                                                     
32 Id. There is no clear health and safety benefit to regulating most of the currently licensed 
occupations. FLATTEN, supra note 4, at 5. Only about thirty professions (most of which are medical, 
dental, mental health, and legal) are licensed in all fifty states and many are licensed in only one state. 
Critics suggest this shows that licensing is unnecessary for most occupations: if a license is issued in only 
one state, and people in the other forty-nine states do not suffer harm, then there is no reason to believe 
that the license is necessary to protect consumers. Id. 
33 Approximately 2.8 million jobs are lost annually because of licensing. FLATTEN, supra note 4, at 
5.   
34 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 51 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).  
35 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974).  
36 Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 
(1990).  
37 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
38 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
39 Id. at 260. 
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receive public assistance.40 The Court said that consideration of what 
procedures due process requires under any given set of circumstances begins 
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function 
involved, as well as the private interest affected by the governmental 
action.41 As a result, the State had to afford due process safeguards before it 
could terminate the benefits. The Court held that the welfare recipients in 
New York had to be afforded an evidentiary hearing before they were 
terminated from the program.42 At the hearing, they would be entitled to 
safeguards that had historically been available in court proceedings: the right 
to present a case orally, to confront an adverse witness, and to receive a 
decision based exclusively on the hearing record.43 
Six years later, the Court again revisited the question of what level of 
process was due in an administrative hearing when it decided Mathews v. 
Eldridge.44 This time, the Court considered whether those receiving Social 
Security disability benefit payments were entitled to an opportunity for an 
evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of the benefits.45 The Court 
established a three-factor test to determine which level of process is due in 
administrative hearings:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.46 
The Court held that applying this balancing test would illuminate the 
appropriate level of process due in any given circumstance.47 Federal and 
state administrative agencies have since applied the Mathews test.  
The type of property interests that due process encompasses extends 
beyond physical ownership of real estate, chattels, or money and includes 
claims of entitlements to government benefits,48 and the guarantee of 
                                                                                                                     
40 Id. at 262.  
41 Id. at 263 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).  
42 Id. at 264.  
43 Id. at 267–68.  
44 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
45 Id. at 323–24.  
46 Id. at 335.  
47 Id.  
48 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 
n.8 (“Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional 
common-law concepts of property. It has been aptly noted that ‘[s]ociety today is built around 
entitlement. The automobile dealer has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses . . . 
all are devices to aid security and independence.” (alteration in original)).  
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procedural due process limits a state agency’s ability to impair or terminate 
that entitlement.49 The Supreme Court has also recognized that the right to 
follow a chosen profession is within the liberty and property concepts of due 
process of law.50  
Because licensed professionals have a property interest associated with 
the retention of their licenses, the government cannot deprive professionals 
of their license unless procedural due process protections are provided and 
followed.51 As such, courts have consistently ruled that, except in emergency 
situations, due process requires a state agency to give a licensed professional 
meaningful and adequate notice and a meaningful hearing before the 
revocation or suspension of the professional’s license.52  
C. The Disciplinary Hearing 
Due process does not require that every hearing before a state agency 
conform to judicial process,53 but does require that a state agency provide 
the opportunity for a full and fair hearing on all disputed issues that are 
critical to the property interests of the party.54 License revocation entails 
such interests.55 A licensed professional has a right to appear personally or 
by counsel before an impartial decision maker, to produce witnesses and 
evidence on his behalf, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to rebut the 
evidence produced against him, and to present reasons—either in person or 
in writing—why the proposed action should not be taken.56  
                                                                                                                     
49 The U.S. Supreme Court has also pointed out that “minimum [procedural] requirements . . . [are] 
a matter of federal law,” and that “they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified 
its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official 
action.” Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). 
50 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 n.11 (1967).  
51 See Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (holding that 
requirements of procedural due process must be met before a state can exclude a person from practicing 
law).  
52 “The purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and 
permit adequate preparation for, an impending ‘hearing.’” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 
436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978). To be meaningful, the notice of a hearing or complaint against an individual “must 
set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity” and be given sufficiently in advance to allow the 
person a reasonable opportunity to prepare. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967). This means that when a 
governmental agency seeks to revoke or suspend a professional’s license, meaningful notice requires that 
the professional is timely and fairly advised of the precise nature of the charges and grounds on which 
the revocation or suspension is sought.  
53 Martinez v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 476 S.W.2d 400, 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).  
54 See, e.g., Trimble v. Tex. State Bd. of Registration for Prof’l Eng’rs, 387 S.W.2d 876, 876 (Tex. 
1965) (holding procedural due process was satisfied by engineer’s attendance at license revocation 
hearing with his attorney, where he introduced evidence and called witnesses).  
55 This is not a universal opinion, however.  
56 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); Morgan v. United States, 304 
U.S. 1, 18–19 (1938). The APA provides a party to a contested case proceeding, which includes license 
revocation, with several important procedural rights and protections. These rights and protections include 
the following: (1) the right to the assistance of counsel; (2) the right to cross-examine witnesses; (3) the 
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A professional licensing board is a state agency, and, as such, its power 
is derived from authorizing statutes, it follows a procedural act, and it is 
responsible for the regulation of a specific field. State practice acts establish 
boards’ missions, structures, and powers, and administrative procedure acts 
govern many board processes, especially for promulgating regulations and 
holding hearings.57 Boards add specificity to general legislative language 
through regulations, guidelines, and internal practices.58 State statutes grant 
the authority to conduct disciplinary hearings and ultimately suspend or 
revoke licenses.59 In addition to issuing licenses, state boards maintain 
standards of practice which they expect professionals to follow.60 If a 
professional is found to have committed a violation of practice standards, 
the licensing board “[has] the authority to impose discipline, which may 
range from a verbal sanction, such as a reprimand, to revocation of the 
license.”61 
No person has a fundamental right to practice a profession.62 Once a 
state issues a license, state law treats it “as a form of property vested in the 
licensee that can be suspended or revoked only if the licensee violates valid 
regulations imposed by the legislature or by the state . . . agency.”63 A 
licensee has a clear expectation of continued enjoyment of a license absent 
proof of conduct warranting its suspension, revocation, or withdrawal.  
                                                                                                                     
right to have the rules of privilege recognized by law given effect by the agency; (4) upon a showing of 
good cause and the payment of estimated costs, the right to have the agency issue subpoenas requiring 
the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, records, papers, or other objects that may be 
necessary and proper; (5) the right to be notified if the agency takes official notice of any material and 
the opportunity to contest such material; (6) the right to engage in pre-hearing discovery; and (7) the right 
to have the hearing be untainted by improper ex parte communications with the agency decision-makers. 
5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551–558 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 116-138).  
57 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS: ASSESSING STATE 
MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES 11 (2006) [hereinafter DHHS]. 
58 Id. 
59 A “hearing” is a quasi-judicial proceeding that requires a more formal process than other actions 
the board may take. The parties to the adjudication must be accorded the traditional safeguards of trial. 
The standard of proof to be used in such hearings is laid out in some, but not all, authorizing statutes. See 
infra Appendix A (showing some states determine standard of proof through the courts, statutes, or not 
at all).  
60 Waring, supra note 29, at 105. 
61 Id. Though physicians are often used as the example, this is the same across the health field. See 
also MARY W. CAZALAS, NURSING AND THE LAW 82 (1978) (“All nurse licensing boards have the 
authority to suspend or revoke the license of a nurse found in violation of specified norms of conduct . . 
. . Suspension and revocation procedures are usually provided for in the act; however, in some 
jurisdictions the procedure is left to the discretion of the board or is contained in general administrative 
procedure acts.”).  
62 Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926).  
63 J. Bruce Bennett, The Rights of Licensed Professionals to Notice and Hearing in Agency 
Enforcement Actions, 7 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 205, 211 (2006).  
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II. STATES DIFFER IN PROCESS DUE WHEN A STATE AGENCY SEEKS TO 
REVOKE OR SUSPEND A PROFESSIONAL LICENSE 
As discussed in Part I, one of a licensing board’s two main regulatory 
functions is the discipline of professionals. While every disciplinary hearing 
has the same basic skeleton—complaint, investigation, formal hearing, and 
decision—states vary considerably in the ways they handle this process.  
A. State Differences in Process 
Complaint resolution typically proceeds through four main stages: 
intake, investigation, pre-hearing preparations, and hearing.64  
1. Investigation 
A complaint filed against a licensee by a third party triggers most 
investigations.65 Some boards will fully investigate every complaint they 
receive, while others will conduct a precursory investigation before deciding 
to devote resources to a full investigation.66 The second approach is 
favorable to some states because a proper full investigation is very resource 
intensive and states prefer to take steps on the front end of the process to 
determine if a full investigation is warranted.67 For instance, in medical 
board disciplinary hearings, some states will have nurses and other medical 
professionals familiar with the field preliminarily review complaints to 
determine whether they warrant a full investigation before allocating the 
resources.68 Alternatively, a few states, such as California, subject all 
complaints to a “medical consultant” review before assigning them for 
investigation in the field.69 As a result, California reports a higher percentage 
of cases closed before investigation than many other states.70 
The full investigation, consisting of document discovery and interviews, 
may be conducted by a single sitting board member, a committee of board 
members, board-hired staff investigators, or government-hired staff 
investigators who service multiple different agencies.71  
                                                                                                                     
64 Id. In some states, such as Maryland and Massachusetts, the board performs all functions of the 
disciplinary process—receiving, investigating, and adjudicating complaints and imposing disciplinary 
sanctions where appropriate. NICOLE DUBE, OFFICE OF LEGAL RESEARCH, OLR RESEARCH REPORT, 
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS IN CONNECTICUT AND OTHER STATES (2009). In other states, such as 
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, the boards do not investigate complaints and are only involved in 
adjudicating complaints, making final disciplinary decisions, and imposing sanctions. Id.   
65 Feighny & Nohe, supra note 24, at 41. However, an audit, inspection, or other source of 
information may initiate an investigation.  
66 DHHS, supra note 57, at 24–25.  
67 Id. at 24. 
68 Id. E.g. Maryland, Pennsylvania. 
69 Id. at 24–25. 
70 Id.  
71 DUBE, supra note 64. See infra Appendix A (“Investigator Employment”). 
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2. Pre-hearing Preparations 
Once the investigator feels he has conducted a thorough investigation, 
the results are presented to either a full board or a panel of board members.72 
The investigator will often make a recommendation as part of his 
presentation. The panel or board determines whether sufficient evidence 
exists to warrant a disciplinary hearing, and, depending on state practices, 
this may exclude those members from being involved in subsequent 
proceedings. This is an informal hearing and the licensees are often not 
present; however, state practices vary.73 It is at this stage in the process that 
most boards decide whether to drop an investigated case, issue a letter of 
warning, or bring formal charges and prosecute the case, keeping significant 
sanctions in mind. Many state licensing boards rely on the Attorney 
General’s office to provide a lawyer who serves as general counsel and 
advises the board in the pre-hearing preparation.74 “The decision to bring 
charges is akin to a probable cause determination” in a criminal 
proceeding.75 It is during this preliminary stage that certain states provide 
licensees with notice by a reasonable service, a copy of the complaint, and a 
reasonable amount of time to answer the complaint.76 An accused and 
charged licensee has a legal right to request an adjudicatory hearing.77 
3. Adjudicatory Hearing 
If the board refers the matter to prosecution, and the licensee does not 
agree to a consent agreement, then a formal hearing is conducted.78 In 
Delaware,79 Massachusetts,80 Minnesota,81 Missouri,82 New Hampshire,83 
                                                                                                                     
72 DUBE, supra note 64. 
73 See id. (detailing how in New York, the Office of Professional Medical Conduct investigates and 
presents the evidence to a board investigation committee, but if formal charges are brought against the 
licensee, another hearing is held before an administrative law judge and a separate three-member board 
panel).  
74 FSMB, supra note 7, at 24. In many states, this same Assistant Attorney General will also 
prosecute the case. See infra Part III for the discussion. 
75 DHHS, supra note 57, at 26.  
76 Typically, fifteen days. See ALL. FOR NAT. HEALTH, KNOW YOUR STATE’S MEDICAL BOARD 
11–80, https://www.anh-usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Know-your-state-medical-board1.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2019) [hereinafter ALLIANCE HEALTH] (showing the State Checklist). 
77 DHHS, supra note 57, at 27.  
78 “The prosecutor will be given terms under which [he or she] can settle the case. The prosecutor 
may be willing to negotiate the settlement terms, but all offers are subject to Board approval and the 
prosecutor’s discretion is limited.” Professional Licensing Board Disciplinary Proceedings: Myths and 
Realities, HAMEL MARCIN DUNN REARDON & SHEA PC, https://www.hmdrlaw.com/news-tobys-
article.html (last visited July 2, 2020).  
79 ALLIANCE HEALTH, supra note 76, at 20.  
80 Id. at 36. 
81 Id. at 39.  
82 Id. at 41.  
83 Id. at 46.  
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New Mexico,84 North Carolina,85 North Dakota,86 and Tennessee,87 board 
members may not participate in the hearing and decision if they have a 
conflict of interest with the practitioner. It is in this process that a singular 
board is both (1) bringing charges against the licensee and (2) deciding the 
final result of those charges. Some states have attempted to counter this lack 
of separation by sending cases to a separate administrative entity.88 States 
have different processes for conducting the hearing: (1) the full board hears 
evidentiary presentations and legal arguments on each case at both the 
preliminary stage and adjudicatory hearing;89 (2) the preliminary 
proceedings are presided over by a subset of the board or administrative law 
judge, followed by a full hearing before the entire medical board;90 (3) an 
administrative court, presided over by an administrative law judge separate 
from the board, hears evidentiary presentations and legal arguments on each 
case, and the board makes the final disciplinary decision;91 and (4) the case 
is sent to a complete separate hearing agency.92 If the board finds against the 
licensee, the licensee must appeal the board’s decision to the same board 
before seeking judicial review.  
The evidentiary standard of proof is the most contested issue of the 
adjudicatory hearing. The standard traditionally applied in civil or 
administrative hearings is preponderance of the evidence, which requires the 
parties to share equally in the risk of error.93 In recent years, some courts 
have concluded that it is constitutionally required to use the clear and 
convincing standard of proof for license revocation.94 The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
84 Id. at 48.  
85 Id. at 51. 
86 Id. at 52. 
87 Id. at 62. 
88 See DHHS, supra note 57, at 27 (explaining that in California, prosecutorial staff is part of the 
Health Quality Enforcement Section of the Attorney General’s Office; in Virginia, the Division of 
Administrative Proceedings).  
89 See infra Appendix A (“Hearing Participants and Procedures”); DHHS, supra note 57, at 27–28.   
90 DHHS, supra note 58, at 27–28. For example, Iowa.  
91 Id. (detailing that, in some states, the board must strongly consider the discipline recommended 
by the administrative law judge or panel). 
92 Id. California and Massachusetts send cases to separate hearing agencies. For example, the 
medical board in California has a specialized unit called the Medical Quality Hearing Panel. This is a 
separate entity that hears evidence and argument. Similarly, Massachusetts has the Massachusetts 
Division of Administrative Law Appeals, which is unspecialized and hears matters from many other state 
agencies and boards. At the close of the evidence, the hearing officer makes written findings of fact and 
law and recommends an outcome to the board. The board decides whether to accept, reject, or modify 
the recommendation in issuing a final decision or order. Id.  
93 Id. at 14. 
94 See, e.g., Ettinger v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 185 Cal. Rptr. 601, 603 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982); Davis v. Wright, 503 N.W.2d 814, 819 (Neb. 1993); Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292, 294 
(Fla. 1987); Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered Dentists of State of Okla., 913 P.2d 1339, 1347 
(Okla. 1996); Nguyen v. Wash. Dep’t of Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 697 
(Wash. 2001); Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 940–41 (Wyo. 2000).  
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has mandated the use of a clear and convincing standard of proof only when 
the individual interest involved is “particularly important,” and “more 
substantial than the mere loss of money,” or when a “significant deprivation 
of liberty” is involved.95 The states that have implemented the clear and 
convincing standard did so under the contention that more process is due 
because the private interests at stake and risk of erroneous harm are so great: 
a professional’s license often represents the fulfillment of extensive 
educational investment and training, and there are harsh and stigmatizing 
consequences of license discipline—humiliation, disgrace, loss of reputation 
and client bases, at times on the basis of an unsubstantiated complaint.96  
B. Potential Procedural Issues 
Depending on which combination of the above procedures a state 
utilizes in an adjudication, various procedural due process issues could arise. 
These issues include: boards applying vague and subjective standards of 
professional conduct; board members serving as investigators, prosecutors, 
and decision makers; the absence of procedural protections available in the 
context of civil disputes given the informal nature under which boards 
operate; and the external pressures boards face in securing tough disciplinary 
penalties from government officials and common interest groups.  
1. Boards Are Permitted to Apply Vague, Subjective Standards of 
Professional Conduct. 
Boards are permitted to apply vague, subjective standards of conduct. 
Most states’ practicing acts do not contain definitive standards in their 
regulations, as it would make prosecuting anyone too difficult. In Nguyen v. 
Washington Department of Health Medical Quality Assurance Commission, 
the Washington Supreme Court expanded on the risks of erroneous 
deprivation when the standard applied is almost entirely subjective:  
It is difficult to imagine a more subjective and relative 
standard than that applied in a medical discipline proceeding 
                                                                                                                     
95 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (regarding termination of parental rights) (quoting 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424–25 (1979) (regarding civil commitment)). From a constitutional 
standpoint, the clear and convincing standard has been found to be required as a matter of due process 
when the threatened loss resulting from civil proceedings is comparable to the consequences of a criminal 
proceeding in the sense that it takes away liberty or permanently deprives individuals of interests that are 
clearly fundamental or significant to personal welfare. Id. 
96 Nguyen v. Dep’t of Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 694 (Wash. 2001) 
(“Loss or suspension of the physician’s license destroys his or her ability to practice medicine, diminishes 
the doctor’s standing in both the medical and lay communities, and deprives the doctor of the benefit of 
a degree for which he or she has spent countless hours and probably tens (if not hundreds) of thousands 
of dollars pursuing.”). 
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where the minimum standard of care is often determined by 
opinion, and necessarily so.97 
On the other end of this argument, some courts have claimed that 
disciplinary proceedings involve objective facts that professional board 
members have special expertise to analyze, thus indicating a minimum risk 
of erroneous deprivations.98 There are three issues with this argument, 
however. First, many boards’ actions relate to matters outside of clinical 
performance or competence.99 Second, most boards have non-practitioner 
members from the public100 who are highly susceptible to persuasion by 
practitioner members’ opinions. Finally, there is inherent bias present when 
a practitioner judges a competitor practitioner.101 
2. Some or All Board Members Serve as Investigator, Prosecutor, and 
Decision Maker. 
Boards and/or their members serve as investigator, prosecutor, and 
decision maker. While the Supreme Court has not found that the blending of 
functions in state boards itself violates due process,102 certain state courts 
have found that it does:  
There is high risk [of error] when an agency seeks to revoke a 
professional license. . . . [R]evocation proceedings have the 
agency acting as investigator, prosecutor, and decision maker. 
The risk is increased where . . . a competitor . . . serves as the 
investigator and makes prosecutorial recommendations to the 
Board.103  
Licensing boards are comprised of colleagues who build relationships and 
trust. The beliefs and recommendation of one member will inevitably 
influence others when there is no separation between functions. 
                                                                                                                     
97 Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 696.   
98 In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 16 (N.J. 1982) (noting physicians are uniquely qualified judges and the 
substantive standards are objective); Gandhi v. Wis. Med. Examining Bd., 483 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Wis. 
1992) (noting physicians are likely to be uniquely qualified to understand the evidence and standards).  
99 See DHHS, supra note 57, at 14 n.15 (explaining that the Federation model medical practice act 
names forty-three disciplinary grounds, including “demonstrated impairment or incompetence” from 
substance abuse, “business related offenses” like misleading advertising, and criminal behavior).  
100 FSMB, supra note 7, at 48.  
101 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (stating that because “the combination of 
investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in 
administrative adjudication[, it] has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry”). 
102 Id. at 58 (“the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, 
constitute a due process violation”).  
103 Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered Dentists, 913 P.2d 1339, 1346 (Okla. 1996). 
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3. Many of the Procedural Protections Available in the Context of 
Civil Disputes Are Absent in the Informal Nature Under Which 
Boards Operate. 
Many of the procedural protections available in the context of civil 
disputes are absent in the informal nature under which boards operate. For 
example, administrative hearings are not required to abide by rules of 
evidence.104 The common belief is that boards are comprised of experts in 
the field, and thus would not be influenced by things such as hearsay. An 
attorney who represents physicians in board proceedings wrote:  
[B]oard and hospital proceedings . . . are held before panels 
comprised mostly of other doctors who are familiar with the 
system. The panel members know that before a case ever gets 
to a hearing, other medical professionals, during the 
investigation . . . already have decided that the doctor has . . . 
committed unprofessional conduct. This creates a 
predisposition to find against the doctor.105  
Some have argued that basic protections such as notice and a hearing are 
sufficient due process, but the Supreme Court disagreed in Santosky v. 
Kramer.106 Despite the fact that such cases involve all the formalities of civil 
trials, the Court nevertheless held that states must employ at least a clear and 
convincing standard, observing:  
[T]he standard of proof is a crucial component of legal 
process, the primary function of which is “to minimize the risk 
of erroneous decisions.” . . . Notice, summons, right to 
counsel, rules of evidence, and evidentiary hearings are all 
procedures to place information before the fact finder. But 
only the standard of proof “instruct[s] the fact finder 
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he 
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions” he 
draws from the information.107 
                                                                                                                     
104 See William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 829, 831 (2004) (“[T]he statutory law governing evidence in administrative proceedings was 
designed to ease the admission and use of relevant evidence from the type of restrictions applied in court 
proceedings while still retaining a standard of integrity. This relaxed standard, however, is more 
amorphous than the particularized judicial rules of evidence and presents continuing problems of 
application.”). 
105 Roy G. Spece, Jr. & John J. Marchalonis, Sound Constitutional Analysis, Moral Principle, and 
Wise Policy Judgment Require a Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard of Proof in Physician 
Disciplinary Proceedings, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 107, 126 (2006). 
106 455 U.S. 745 (1982).  
107 Id. at 757 n.9 (alteration in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13 
(1979) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 357, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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4. Boards Face External Pressures to Secure Tough Disciplinary 
Penalties from Government Officials and Common Interest Groups. 
Boards face external pressures to secure tough disciplinary penalties 
from government officials and common interest groups. Disciplinary boards 
are often asked to judge their progress by the number of penalties they 
successfully impose.108 As a result, factors other than protecting the public 
motivate boards when they chase convictions. 
III. ANALYSIS: PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE ALONE IS NOT 
SUFFICIENT DUE PROCESS 
In trying to determine the level of procedure necessary for professional 
licensing hearings to satisfy procedural due process, the evidentiary standard 
of proof inevitably plays a large role in the consideration. A higher burden 
can supplement for a lack of other procedural safeguards when considering 
procedural protections as a whole. This leads to the question of whether the 
preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient due process for 
professional license revocation hearings. As this Section will illustrate, the 
preponderance of the evidence standard alone is not sufficient due process 
in license revocation hearings.  
A. State Split: Comparing Preponderance of the Evidence and Clear and 
Convincing States 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the standard of proof 
implicates due process rights in that it serves “to allocate the risk of error 
between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the 
ultimate decision.”109 Currently, the states are split as to the appropriate 
standard in a state license revocation proceeding. Seventeen states have 
established a clear and convincing standard of proof through either 
legislation or common law.110 Thirty-two states have maintained a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, by legislation, common law, or 
unspoken tradition.111 
                                                                                                                     
108 DHHS, supra note 57, at 5. Boards measure success by only two performance measures: first, 
the number of disciplinary sanctions imposed; and second, the timeliness of complaint resolution. Id.  
109 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344–45 
(1976). 
110 FSMB, supra note 7, at 67. See infra Appendix A (“Standards of Proof Required”).  
111 See infra Appendix A for a list of cases discussing the appropriate standard for their state. If a 
“Standard of Proof Required” is without citation, then it is maintained as “unspoken tradition.” See 
Johnson v. Ark. Bd. of Exam’rs in Psychology, 808 S.W.2d 766 (Ark. 1991); Sherman v. Comm’n on 
Licensure to Practice the Healing Art, 407 A.2d 595 (D.C. 1979); Eaves v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 467 
N.W.2d 234 (Iowa 1991); Rucker v. Mich. Bd. of Med., 360 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. 1984); In re Wang, 441 
N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1989); In re Grimm, 635 A.2d 456 (N.H. 1993); In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7 (N.J. 
1982); Gallant v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 974 P.2d 814, 816 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Anonymous v. State Bd. 
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1. Preponderance of the Evidence 
Thirty-two states maintain a preponderance of the evidence standard in 
license revocation hearings: some state courts or legislatures have explicitly 
established the standard, while others have no source authority (and refrain 
from establishing such authority), but continue to use preponderance of the 
evidence because it is typically employed in civil proceedings.112 The 
primary policy rationale for maintaining a preponderance of the evidence 
standard in license revocation hearings is the protection of the general 
welfare of the public. The logic of public protection is very straightforward: 
boards should identify unqualified or unfit practitioners and bar them from 
practice in the state, which directly protects citizens from them. A 
preponderance standard makes this easier. Indirectly, imposition of 
sanctions may also lead other practitioners to practice more carefully or to 
tailor their practices to their capabilities.113 It is also argued that the clear and 
convincing standard would not eliminate or meaningfully reduce the risk of 
an erroneous fact finding or determination, but would express a preference 
for one side’s interests:114 it reduces the risk of error for the licensee, but 
increases the risk for the public.  
In In re Polk, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered whether the 
State Board of Medical Examiners unconstitutionally revoked the license of 
a doctor who was facing various malpractice and professional misconduct 
claims.115 In analyzing the due process issue, the court applied the Mathews 
balancing test.116 The court determined that a license is a property right, but 
has “always [been] subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest”;117 
emphasized the right and duty of the government to protect the public, 
                                                                                                                     
of Med. Exam’rs, 496 S.E.2d 17 (S.C. 1998); Nguyen v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health Med. Quality 
Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 690 n.3 (Wash. 2001) (listing jurisdictions that have asserted the 
preponderance standard is sufficient to satisfy due process); Gandhi v. State Med. Examining Bd., 483 
N.W.2d 295 (Wis. 1992). Jurisdictions requiring the higher standard of proof: Silva v. Superior Court, 
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Ettinger v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 185 Cal. Rptr. 601 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987); Rife v. Dep’t of Prof’l 
Regulation, 638 So. 2d 542 (Fla. App. 1994); Miss. State Bd. of Nursing v. Wilson, 624 So. 2d 485 (Miss. 
1993); Davis v. Wright, 503 N.W.2d 814 (Neb. 1993) (holding that medical discipline, like attorney 
discipline, requires clear and convincing standard); Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered 
Dentists, 913 P.2d 1339 (Okla. 1996); Robinson v. State ex rel. Okla. State Bd. of Med. Licensure & 
Supervision, 916 P.2d 1390 (Okla. 1996); Sobel v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 882 P.2d 606 (Or. Ct. App. 
1994); Bernard v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 465 P.2d 917 (Or. Ct. App. 1970); In re Zar, 434 N.W.2d 598 
(S.D. 1989); Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931 (Wyo. 2000); Devous v. Wyo. State Bd. of Med. 
Exam’rs, 845 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1993).  
112 See infra Appendix A (comparing Alaska and Maryland to Arkansas, Colorado, and Maine, for 
example).  
113 DHHS, supra note 57, at 8.  
114 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).  
115 Polk, 449 A.2d at 11.  
116 Id. at 13.  
117 Id. at 17.  
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assuring its health and safety through regulating the medical profession;118 
and ultimately held that the preponderance standard “fairly allocates the risk 
of mistake between the[] two parties and sufficiently reduces for both the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation.”119  
The court held the preponderance standard sufficient for several reasons, 
but namely because a license can only be revoked in New Jersey under 
“heightened and strict substantive standards,” including “insanity, physical 
or mental incapacity, [and] professional incompetence.”120 In re Polk 
concluded that the preponderance standard was sufficient to reasonably 
guard against mistakes, and thus satisfies the constitutional demands of due 
process when balanced with the interests involved.121 New Jersey has other 
procedural safeguards in place that counteract the lower evidentiary 
standard, such as hiring independent administrative law judges as hearing 
officers, and investigators are employed by a different state agency.122 
In Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Board, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals emphasized many of the same points as the Polk court.123 Gandhi 
recognized the importance of the private interest and the tremendous 
deprivation suffered when a medical license is lost, but noted that the license 
may be regained at a later date.124 Gandhi emphasized the government’s 
obligation to protect the welfare of its citizens, which is “superior to the 
privilege of any individual to practice his or her profession.”125 Wisconsin 
does not have the same level of procedural separation as New Jersey.126  
In North Dakota State Board of Medical Examiners v. Hsu, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court examined this issue and reached the same 
conclusion.127 Hsu minimized the State’s role as investigator, prosecutor, 
and adjudicator—a fact often used to support the clear and convincing 
standard.128 Balancing these interests, Hsu upheld the preponderance 
standard.129 North Dakota maintains several procedural safeguards that help 
counteract the lower evidentiary standard: hearing officers are independent 
administrative law judges, and there is a separation of general counsel and 
prosecutor.130 
                                                                                                                     
118 Id. at 22.  
119 Id. at 15.  
120 Id. at 15. 
121 Id. at 16–17.  
122 See infra Appendix A (New Jersey).  
123 Gandhi v. Wis. Med. Examining Bd., 483 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Wis. 1992). 
124 Id. at 299.  
125 Id.  
126 See infra Appendix A (Compare Wisconsin to New Jersey).  
127 N.D. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs v. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d 216, 216 (N.D. 2007). 
128 Id. at 231. 
129 Id. at 230.  
130 See infra Appendix A (South Dakota). 
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2. Clear and Convincing Evidence 
 “Protection of the public” is the paramount governmental interest 
commonly argued to be threatened by utilizing the clear and convincing 
standard. However, the full governmental interests include:  
(1) protecting the public from physical, financial, or 
psychological injury resulting from practitioner “misconduct”; 
(2) preserving existing [practitioner-client] relationships and 
general public access to practitioners; . . . [(3)] fostering public 
security and respect for the law through the symbolic 
statement that our society will not tolerate a significant risk of 
erroneous deprivations . . . .131 	
These latter two concerns are best protected by use of the clear and 
convincing standard.132  
The Court’s opinion in Santosky v. Kramer133 establishes a preliminary 
presumption in favor of greater procedural safeguards. In Santosky, the 
Court held that the clear and convincing standard is constitutionally 
mandated in termination of parental rights cases,134 stating that the “standard 
of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on individual 
liberty,” and that an elevated standard is constitutionally required when the 
individual faces “a significant deprivation of liberty” or “stigma.”135 
Santosky further explained that “a stricter standard of proof would reduce 
factual error without imposing substantial fiscal burdens upon the State.”136 
Some state courts have found this analysis applicable to professional license 
revocation hearings.137  
In Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists, the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma discussed the standard of proof the Constitution requires 
in professional disciplinary proceedings.138 The Court understood a 
professional license to be a protected property interest, the loss of which is 
penal in character and destroys a professional’s “means of livelihood.”139 
Johnson recognized the State’s interest “in the health, safety and welfare of 
its citizens,” but considered the risk of erroneous deprivation to be high, 
particularly because the state agency is the investigator, prosecutor, and 
decision maker.140 When balanced against the interests involved, this high 
                                                                                                                     
131 Spece, Jr. & Marchalonis, supra note 105, at 128.  
132 Id. 
133 455 U.S. 745 (1982).  
134 Id. at 769–70. 
135 Id. at 755–56 (alterations omitted) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)). 
136 Id. at 767. 
137 See infra Appendix A (noting the “Standards of Proof Required” for California, Washington).  
138 913 P.2d 1339, 1342 (Okla. 1996).  
139 Id. at 1345.  
140 Id. at 1346. 
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risk of error led the Johnson court to hold that due process required clear and 
convincing evidence in professional disciplinary proceedings.141 Other than 
a higher standard of proof, Oklahoma does not have many procedural 
safeguards in place.142  
In Painter v. Abels, the Supreme Court of Wyoming, relying on 
Johnson, noted the “quasi-criminal” nature of these proceedings.143 
Applying the Mathews balancing test, Painter called the private interest 
“substantial” and divided the potential loss into three components: (1) the 
loss of a property right, (2) the loss of a livelihood, and (3) the loss of 
professional reputation.144 Balancing this interest was the “state’s interest in 
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens from a medical 
licensee’s incompetence or misconduct.”145 Finally, Painter concludes that 
the risk of error is high because the same agency investigates, prosecutes, 
and decides.146 For these reasons, Painter held that due process requires clear 
and convincing evidence.147 Other than a higher standard of proof, Wyoming 
does not have many procedural safeguards in place.148 
The Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in Nguyen149 details the 
private interests at stake in disciplinary proceedings, which favor application 
of a clear and convincing standard:  
The intermediate clear preponderance standard is required in a 
variety of civil situations “to protect particularly important 
individual interests,” that is, those interests more important 
than the interest against erroneous imposition of a mere money 
judgment. Examples of such proceedings include involuntary 
mental illness commitment, fraud, “some other quasi-criminal 
wrongdoing by the defendant” as well as the risk of having 
one’s “reputation tarnished erroneously.” Medical disciplinary 
proceedings fit triply within this intermediate category 
because they (1) involve much more than a mere money 
judgment, (2) are quasi-criminal, and (3) also potentially 
tarnish one’s reputation.150 
Nguyen also observes that while the interest of the individual may 
dictate a higher standard of proof to avoid erroneous deprivation, the higher 
                                                                                                                     
141 Id. at 1347. 
142 See infra Appendix A (Oklahoma). 
143 998 P.2d 931, 941 (Wyo. 2000). 
144 Id.  
145 Id.  
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 See infra Appendix A (Wyoming).  
149 29 P.3d 689 (Wash. 2001). 
150 Id. at 693 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)). 
 
343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd   437 7/28/20   10:49 AM
 
966 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2 
burden vindicates important state interests: society has an important interest 
in the standard of practice not falling below the acceptable minimum, and in 
ensuring that a practitioner not be erroneously deprived his license, as that 
would erroneously deprive the public access to and benefit from his 
services.151 
Of note, nearly all states apply the clear and convincing evidence 
standard to disbarment hearings, regardless of what standard it applies in 
medical license revocation hearings.152 This standard is recommended by the 
American Bar Association.153 The proclaimed reason for this difference is 
that, where disbarment of attorneys is always permanent, there is no “de jure 
‘permanent’ punishment for doctors.”154 Unless otherwise specified, a 
doctor can reapply for their revoked or suspended license immediately.155 
However, while most doctors can reapply to get revoked licenses back, most 
do not, making for de facto permanence to the sanction.156 
B. Preponderance Alone Is Not Enough 
 “A process satisfies minimum constitutional requisites inherently due 
when it provides adequate safeguards to the citizen confronted by an action 
instigated against him by the state. Primary among these safeguards is the 
standard of proof.”157  
Most state courts that have analyzed the standard under the Mathews 
factors and found preponderance of the evidence sufficient have done so 
because they have other procedural safeguards in place that downplay the 
risk of erroneous deprivation.158 It is clear that use of the preponderance of 
the evidence standard alone is not sufficient to provide licensees with due 
process of law.159 Instead, for states to apply preponderance of the evidence 
                                                                                                                     
151 Id.  
152 See 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 142 (noting that all but Alaska, Arkansas, Kentucky, and 
North Dakota maintain a preponderance of the evidence standard for attorney disciplinary proceedings). 
153 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“shall be 
established by clear and convincing evidence”). There is no American Medical Association equivalent. 
154 Milton Heumann, Brian Pinaire & Jennifer Lerman, Prescribing Justice: The Law and Politics 
of Discipline for Physician Felony Offenders, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 21 (2007). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. Additionally, this does not consider that many practitioners’ practices are permanently ruined 
due to diminished public perception and good will that accompanies even a preliminary complaint, let 
alone a full revocation.  
157 Nguyen v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 691 
(Wash. 2001). 
158 See discussion infra Section III.B.1 (explaining how New Jersey uses a preponderance of the 
evidence standard, but has numerous safeguards in place to balance against the lower standard). But see 
discussion infra Section III.B.2 (explaining how although Maine has a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, it does not have other procedural safeguards in place, resulting in a higher likelihood of 
erroneous deprivation). 
159 See discussion infra Section III.B.2 (demonstrating that Maine’s lack of additional procedural 
safeguards beyond the preponderance of the evidence standard is insufficient). 
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in license revocation hearings and yet maintain appropriate procedural due 
process, there must be additional safeguards in place to protect the 
licensee—preponderance, plus. The “plus” must be some form of distinct 
procedural separation between the various roles on the board. If a state has 
no other safeguards in place, then sufficient process due in license 
revocation hearings requires a higher clear and convincing standard. 
New Jersey and Maine both utilize a preponderance of the evidence 
standard for professional license revocation hearings, yet only New Jersey 
provides its licensee sufficient procedural due process.160  
1. New Jersey 
The state of New Jersey serves as an example of a state that, while 
strongly establishing and subsequently reaffirming a common law principle 
of the preponderance of the evidence standard in professional license 
revocation hearings, has also utilized numerous “plusses” to balance the 
lower standard. As such, New Jersey provides its licensees sufficient due 
process in the average adjudicatory hearing. 
As detailed in Part III.A, the court in In re Polk found that the 
preponderance of the evidence standard supplied sufficient procedural due 
process  under the Mathews test.161 However, the court also made note of the 
various additional procedural safeguards New Jersey had established for its 
licensees.162 
For example, when the New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners 
(BME) learns that a doctor has allegedly committed an offense, it begins a 
preliminary hearing before a subcommittee called the Preliminary 
Evaluation Committee.163 The subcommittee listens to the doctor’s 
testimony and reviews and categorizes every complaint, determining which 
cases are “no cause” (where no offense was committed), and which ones 
have probable cause to continue in the disciplinary process.164 The 
subcommittee subsequently reports those cases where it is believed that an 
offense has been committed to the full BME and offers recommendations as 
to how to proceed with each case.165 After deliberation, the BME will make 
recommendations to the Attorney General’s office, which represents the 
                                                                                                                     
160 Infra Sections III.B.1–2.  
161 Infra Section III.A.1. 
162 Id. 
163 Heumann, Pinaire & Lerman, supra note 154, at 12; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-19.8 (Westlaw 
through L.2019, ch. 266 and J.R. No. 22) (“The State Board of Medical Examiners shall establish a 
Medical Practitioner Review Panel.”). 
164 Heumann, Pinaire & Lerman, supra note 154, at 12–13; see DIV. OF CONSUMER AFF., STATE 
BD. OF MED. EXAM’RS, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 47 (2006), 
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/bme/bmelaws.pdf.  
165 Heumann, Pinaire & Lerman, supra note 153, at 13. 
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BME, as to how the AG should proceed.166 The Attorney General’s office 
utilizes two deputy attorneys general to represent the BME in disciplinary 
proceedings—one counseling the BME and the other prosecuting on behalf 
of BME.167 If a formal complaint has been lodged, then there will be a 
hearing.168 The BME has a choice of holding the hearing either before the 
full BME or an administrative law judge (ALJ).169 When a hearing is held 
before the ALJ, the ALJ issues an initial decision—essentially no more than 
a recommendation—to the BME, which then reaches a final decision. Thus, 
the BME’s action ultimately becomes permanent public record as a final 
order.170   
New Jersey has implemented impartiality and eliminated potential 
biases throughout the entire complaint process. As such, a preponderance of 
the evidence standard is sufficient in this state.  
2. Maine 
Maine serves as an example of the erroneous deprivation that can occur 
when there is a lower evidentiary burden and limited (if any) separation of 
functions on the board.  
Maine has acknowledged that a person has a due process-protected 
property interest in a professional license.171 But Maine has not decided the 
requisite standard of proof for license revocation in either common law or 
statute, and thus maintains a preponderance of the evidence standard for 
license revocation hearings.172 Additionally, Maine contains no “plus” 
safeguards.173  
                                                                                                                     
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 14. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Balian v. Bd. of Licensure in Med., 722 A.2d 364, 367 (Me. 1999); see also Bd. of Overseers of 
the Bar v. Lefebvre, 707 A.2d 69, 73 (Me. 1998) (discussing due process protections implicated in 
hearing to suspend attorney’s license); Bd. of Registration in Med. v. Fiorica, 488 A.2d 1371, 1375 (Me. 
1985) (discussing due process protections implicated in proceedings to revoke doctor’s license).  
172 See Gashgai v. Bd. of Registration of Med., 390 A.2d 1080, 1084 n.5 (Me. 1978) (“Because of 
our disposition of this appeal it becomes unnecessary to address the issue of burden of proof.”). But see 
Bd. of Licensure in Med. v. Diering, No. AP-08-23, 2008 WL 9500435, at *3 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 
2008) (“Although the Law Court has not explicitly recognized a default preponderance of the evidence 
standard in Maine’s Administrative Procedure Act, this standard is common in professional disciplinary 
cases . . . . [T]he rationale for applying the clear and convincing standard of proof does not apply to 
license disciplinary proceedings. The clear and convincing standard ‘was first applied in equity to claims 
which experience had shown to be inherently subject to fabrication, lapse of memory, or the flexibility 
of conscience.’ . . . . No such concern in the context of a license disciplinary proceeding exists to justify 
a departure from the general rule that requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” (citation 
omitted)). 
173 See infra Appendix A (Maine).  
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In Maine, the board receives a complaint and assigns it to an investigator 
who is either a single member of the board or a “committee” of the board 
who presents findings to the full board. If a committee of the board 
investigates, it should be prohibited from taking part in any portion of the 
subsequent proceeding, but this is often not the case.174 The investigator(s) 
will then present findings to the board with a recommendation. The board—
with help from its assigned Assistant Attorney General (AAG) serving as 
general counsel—then decides whether discipline is warranted; if so, the 
board forwards to prosecution for formal hearing. The same Assistant 
Attorney General that advises the board to take the case175 then prosecutes 
the case to the board. After the hearing, the board votes and issues a final 
decision. Licensees can appeal back to the same full board.176 
In Zegel v. Board of Social Work Licensure, the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court has said in dictum that “the combination of investigator, prosecutor, 
and sitting member of the adjudicatory panel, even if ostensibly a 
nonparticipating member, creates an intolerably high risk of unfairness.”177 
Two of the most glaring of these are the roles of the investigator and 
attorney. The investigator(s) will often present findings of the investigation 
to the board with a recommendation, and then sit on the board for the 
adjudicatory hearing—after having conducted an investigation and made a 
recommendation to their colleagues.178 AAGs work with their assigned 
boards on a daily basis as general counsel and have built rapport and trust 
with the board members, which carries great persuasion during the AAG’s 
prosecution of the case and when the board is tried with making a final 
decision.  
Moore v. State of Maine Board of Dental Examiners179 provides a good 
example of the issues with the lack of separation in Maine license revocation 
hearings. The petitioner in that case appealed a decision by the Board that 
                                                                                                                     
174 Compare Gashgai v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 390 A.2d 1080, 1082 n.1 (Me. 1978) (“[W]e 
observe that the combination of investigator, prosecutor and sitting member of the adjudicatory panel, 
even if ostensibly a nonparticipating member, creates an intolerably high risk of unfairness.”), with Brief 
of Petitioner/Appellant at 2–3, Zegel v. State of Me. Bd. of Soc. Work Licensure, No. PEN-03-335 (Me. 
July 10, 2003), 2003 WL 24222872 (Me) (noting that the Board of Social Work Licensure allowed a 
committee member, who voted twice to advance the case to a formal hearing during the initial stages of 
the investigation, to take part in subsequent proceedings as an expert witness for the prosecution).  
175 Presumably advising on the legal analysis and why she believes it is a good case to try—belief 
she can prove the licensee has violated the requisite standards.  
176 Maine Administrative Procedure Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8001 (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Reg. Sess.).  
177 Zegel v. Bd. of Soc. Work Licensure, 843 A.2d 18, 22 (Me. 2004) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Gashgai v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 390 A.2d 1080, 1082 n.1 (Me. 1987)). In Zegel, the court held 
that it “need not determine whether the process here crossed the line because the error, if any, was 
harmless.” Id. The court has yet to determine the issue.  
178 Though they may not vote. See Maine Administrative Procedure Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
5, § 8001 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
179 No. AP-07-65, at *3–4 (Me. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2008). 
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found he had violated Maine’s unprofessional conduct statute180 by 
providing care that failed to meet minimum accepted standards of 
practice.181 The complainant was “recommend[ed] and encourage[ed]”182 by 
a member of the Board to file a complaint with the Maine Board of Dental 
Examiners. This board member also testified at the hearing. One single 
member of the Board recommended the complaint, initiated investigation, 
testified at the hearing as an expert,183 and then sat on the Board and listened 
to the rest of the Board debate the findings of a case he brought himself. In 
closing argument, the AAG stressed the importance of weighing the 
credibility of the witnesses.184  
It is inconceivable to believe that the board member’s testimony, various 
roles in the process, relationship to the Board, and presence at the proceeding 
did not have an effect on the decision of the rest of the Board. The Superior 
Court agreed:  
The gloss put on the facts by the Board was impacted by the 
knowledge that an important and influential member of the 
Board believed this case to constitute a violation, treated the 
patient, acted as a witness in front of the Board, and was the 
person who recommended to petitioner that she file [the] 
complaint . . . .185  
Because the Maine legislature has not taken steps to restructure 
administrative adjudicatory hearings, a higher clear and convincing standard 
would help combat these biases and provide a barrier through which the 
insufficient evidence would have had to break.  
In applying the Mathews v. Eldridge186 three-factor test to Maine license 
revocation procedure, factor two, “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such 
interests through procedures used,”187 greatly tips the scale toward injustice 
and a high risk of erroneous deprivation. Part of the risk of erroneous 
                                                                                                                     
180 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3282-A(2)(F) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) 
(“Unprofessional conduct. A licensee is considered to have engaged in unprofessional conduct if the 
licensee violates a standard of professional behavior . . . that has been established in the practice for 
which the licensee is licensed.”); id. § 3282-A(2)(E) (“Incompetence in the practice for which the licensee 
is licensed. A licensee is considered incompetent in the practice if the licensee has: (1) Engaged in 
conduct that evidences a lack of ability or fitness to perform the duties owed by the licensee to a client 
or patient or the general public; or (2) Engaged in conduct that evidences the lack of knowledge or 
inability to apply principles or skills to carry out the practice for which the licensee is licensed[.]”). 
181 Moore, No. AP-07-65, at *1. 
182 Id. at *2.  
183 Dr. Fister’s testimony reveals multiple instances where he compared the work of petitioner with 
what he would have done. Id. 
184 Id. at *3 (“Had an appropriate radiograph been taken, such as Dr. Fister’s, the root tip would 
have been visualized and the patient conformed, hopefully.”).  
185 Id. at *4.  
186 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
187 Id. 
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injustice analysis is “the probable value, if any, of additional procedural 
safeguards,”188 and Maine has almost none.189  
Clearly, preponderance alone is not sufficient to protect the interests of 
the licensees. If Maine is to keep the preponderance standard, which seems 
likely, the State needs to implement additional procedural safeguards.  
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that licensees have a protected interest in their licenses that 
requires sufficient procedural due process of law in revocation hearings. It 
is equally clear that the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard 
alone is not sufficient to provide licensees with due process of law. In order 
for states to appropriately apply preponderance of the evidence in license 
revocation hearings, there must be additional safeguards in place to protect 
the licensee—“preponderance, plus.” Completely separate adjudicative 
agencies for each step of the process is not required for sufficient due 
process. In the example of Maine, a due process “plus” could take the form 
of (1) adding additional seats to the Board so as to allow for the full removal 
of the investigators from the rest of the hearing and still maintain quorum; 
(2) adding additional seats to the Board so as to allow for the removal of the 
committee who decides to bring the case to prosecution from the 
adjudicatory hearing and still maintain quorum; and (3) having split board 
duties so that one serves as general counsel and another prosecutes cases. 
But sufficient due process dictates that if a board uses preponderance, it must 
utilize a “plus.” 
  
                                                                                                                     
188 Id. 
189 See infra Appendix A (displaying that Maine lacks most procedural safeguards that other 
preponderance states have implemented). 
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i This information is aggregated from FSMB, supra note 7; DHHS, supra note 57; and the 
applicable state administrative procedure statutes.  
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